The sub-prime crisis and its impact on the Hungarian banking sector by Márton Nagy & Viktor E. Szabó
MNB BULLETIN • APRIL 2008 35
THE BEGINNING AND SPREAD OF THE 
US SUB-PRIME CRISIS
From the middle of the 1990s, sub-prime mortgage loans
exhibited spectacular growth in the USA. Essentially, sub-
prime
2 mortgage loans are loans provided to higher-risk
borrowers at interest rates which are 200 to 300 basis points
3
higher than the interest rates of loans granted to ‘prime’
borrowers. A large portion of these debtors either had an
unsatisfactory credit history or a history of payment
problems. In addition, there is also an Alt-A category, which
include otherwise relatively good borrowers, who either lack
reliable proof of income or have a high debt-to-income ratio.
At the beginning of 2007, according to IMF estimates sub-
prime loans represented 15 per cent of the total mortgage
loan portfolio in the USA, while Alt-A loans comprised
another 5 per cent. According to estimations, the ratio of sub-
prime and Alt-A category loans within the securitised
mortgage loan portfolio was 14 per cent and 12 per cent,
respectively (Chart 1).
The rapid expansion of sub-prime and Alt-A loans peaked
between 2004 and 2006. A good indication of this expansion
was the simultaneous growth in sub-prime and Alt-A loans,
which together represented 40 per cent of the portfolio of
new loans in 2006, as opposed to 10 per cent in 2003.
During this period, even debtors with a blemished credit
history were able to obtain loans as US real estate prices
continued to increase. Both borrowers and lenders assumed
that housing prices would continue to increase and that the
capital gain from home price appreciation would be sufficient
to pay back the loans of the home-owners. Due to the fact
that, from the end of 2003 growing interest rates made it
increasingly difficult for some sub-prime borrowers to obtain
financing, lenders gradually started to relax their credit
conditions. Thanks to the relaxed credit standards, an
increasing number of borrowers were offered loans even
though their equity was less than 10 per cent and they did not
The last few years were characterised by high risk appetite and global spreading of a substantial amount of under-priced risks
as a consequence of bank’ securitisation activities. The turbulence triggered by the US mortgage market led to the re-pricing of
risks, which in turn has resulted in significant losses for the financial sector, and temporary impairment of certain market
segments. In addition to the direct losses suffered by US and European banks, these institutions also had to face increasing cost
of funds and shrinking funding.
Even though the Hungarian banking sector had no direct exposure to the products involved in the US mortgage market, the
global growth of risk premiums has caused increasing funding costs and shortening maturities of foreign funds. As an another
negative development, there were disturbances in the Hungarian financial markets, in particular in the domestic government
bond market,
1 and increases in the expected yield on Hungarian assets.
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1 For details, see MNB Report on Financial Stability (April 2008) Box 2.1, visit: http://english.mnb.hu/Engine.aspx?page=mnben_stabil&ContentID=10898.
2 For an explanation of the terms and abbreviations, please refer to the Glossary at the end of the document.
3 In addition, certain incidental costs associated with these are higher than those of prime mortgage loans.have sufficient proof of income, or enjoyed lending options
with negative depreciation, or lower instalments in the initial
incentive period. As a result, by 2006 the share of adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs) ensuring lower initial interest
payments typically for up to two years, had reached 50% in
the sub-prime category.
The strong demand of investors for high-yield instruments
also contributed to the dynamic expansion of sub-prime
mortgage loans. Consequently, mortgage-backed securities
were issued in growing quantities along with their re-
packaged version, structured loan products called CDOs,
which transferred the credit risks associated with sub-prime
mortgages to investment groups with varying risk appetites.
While base interest rates were at an all-time low, institutional
investors typically became highly leveraged, i.e. the bank
loans used to finance their investments exceeded the amount
of their equity (hedge funds) or they issued short-term notes
(conduits). Long-term investments were generally financed
by rolling over very short-term funds. Due to low interest
rate volatility and increasing asset prices, this strategy was
beneficial.
The underlying problems in the sub-prime mortgage market
and the issue of mispriced risks started to surface in 2006,
when housing prices began to depreciate. The drastically
decelerating growth of home prices combined with increasing
interest rates resulted in payment difficulties. As a result, the
ratio of delinquencies on sub-prime loans increased
substantially, reaching 17.3 per cent by the last quarter of
2007 (Chart 2). This ratio exceeded the previous (2002)
record, and featured a considerably steeper rate of growth
than that of older vintages, while the loan portfolio
drastically increased. The growing number of delinquencies
on sub-prime mortgage loans is expected to peak this year as
the re-pricing of these loans, which were originally offered
with fixed teaser interest rates, continues.
5 In addition, the
growing volume of delinquent loans has started to spread to
the Alt-A category loans, and the same trend has been
observed even for vehicle loans and credit cards.
6
As the growth rate of defaults rose, prices of asset-backed
securities (ABS) and structured credit products (CDO)
associated with mortgage loans declined significantly, and as
a result certain institutional investors suffered substantial
losses. Investors stopped buying structured credit products to
avoid further losses and increased risks, and thus they
remained on the balance sheets of the issuing banks. The
banks attempted to cover their credit exposures by
purchasing credit derivatives (CDS), which set off a sharp
increase in the prices of these derivatives (i.e. the cost of
hedging). In order to reduce additional potential losses,
banks cut back on the financing of leveraged clients. As a
result, because of the increasing losses of leveraged entities
(mainly conduits), issuance of short-term notes became
impossible.
The abrupt contraction in short-term funds forced a number
of investment funds to quickly liquidate their leveraged
positions. As several funds followed the same investment
strategy, they attempted to make similar deals at the same
time, including a large part of their individual ABS and CDO
portfolios. Since they did not essentially trade these
instruments (they held them until they matured), their value
was determined on the basis of financial models. Following
their forced sales, these products showed up on the market,
however, their sales price was extremely low due to the one-
sided selling pressure, and investors had to mark down the
value of these assets. This led to extreme price changes, and
occasionally resulted in markets ‘drying up’. As funding was
scarce, the funds tried to open up financing opportunities on
markets with no direct link to the mortgage market,
spreading the wave of selling to other markets.
From the end of June, an increasing number of market players
began reporting losses or bankruptcy. Although the turbulence
primarily affected US banks and investment funds, some
European financial institutions and funds also faced substantial
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Sub-prime mortgage loans Prime mortgage loans
Total mortgage loans
Per cent Per cent
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.
4
4 Source: http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/60619.htm.
5 A typical example of this is the so-called ‘2-28’loan, i.e. loans provided in 2006 with the first two years fixed at a lower, initial interest rate, which are scheduled to be
readjusted this year to a higher rate for the remaining term of the loan.
6This document is not intended to discuss the impact of the sub-prime crisis on the economy of the USA.losses, and as a result, risk appetite weakened. Due to the
combined effect of the selling wave set off by the sub-prime
crisis and investors’ desire to minimise their risk exposure,
pressures to sell higher-risk instruments and the demand for
risk-free and highly liquid instruments skyrocketed.
The sub-prime crisis and money market turbulence affected
banks through several channels. In addition to the direct
exposure of banks (mortgage loans), their investment
portfolio included mortgage-backed securities as well.
Legally independent special entities, which were founded by
banks to underwrite their leveraged positions (e.g. conduit,
SPV or SIV) amplified their exposure. Even though the
founding banks generally played a major role in their
financing, the related exposure was off-balance sheet, and
was not included in the books. Additional risk was posed by
the loans which banks extended to the related, opaquely
operating hedge funds. Due to the multi-layered potential
exposure, it was impossible to assess the actual exposure of
specific banks. Last August and subsequently in November
this uncertainty led to a crisis in confidence among banks, as
well as the drying up of commercial securities markets used
by banks to raise funds, and this in turn was followed by the
drying up of dollar and euro inter-bank markets.
After hitting banks and investment funds, the crisis spread to
US financial guarantors. Financial guarantors were originally
established to insure local government bonds, but over recent
years they extended their activities to the insurance of asset-
backed securities and structured credit products. Covered by
the insurance of financial guarantors with a generally higher
credit rating (usually the top rating, AAA), low-rated issuers
were able to issue securities with the lower interest rates
connected to higher rating categories. However, as the
number of defaults increased credit insurers were crippled by
ever-growing payment obligations and consequently, they
faced the threat of downgrade. In addition, the downgrading
of credit insurers instantly deteriorates the rating of all
securities insured by them, causing additional losses to the
owners of the insured securities.
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Chart 3
The spread of sub-prime crisis





profitability and real economy 
effects
Risk Appetite Shock Confidence Crisis Credit Crunch
market losses
confidence crisis
increase of counterparty risk
drying up of submarkets
higher cost of funding
reprising of structured products
tighting of credit conditions
Forrás: Mortgage Bankers Association. Through a general, sharp decline in risk appetite, the sub-
prime crisis led to the re-pricing of risk on other credit
markets as well. The risk premiums of corporate bonds with
lower (speculative) credit ratings increased drastically, and to
a lesser degree, the increasing risk premiums affected higher-
rated corporate loans as well (Chart 4). In addition to
increasing risk premiums, there were other signs indicating
troubles on the credit market, such as a rising number of
leveraged corporate buyouts executed by private equity
funds, and cancellations of scheduled corporate bond issues.
As a result of concerns about the potential spread of credit
market troubles and the expected decline in mergers and
acquisitions, the stock market finally tumbled, and the
primary victims of the deterioration were stocks in the
financial sector.
Since it is still difficult to determine the actual extent of the
losses, a significant part of the uncertainty is attached to the
financial sector regarding the further development of the sub-
prime crisis and its potential dispersion. According to the
IMF, the major credit rating institutions and investment
banks, the expected losses could be anywhere between USD
300 and 1000 billion.
7 At the beginning of March, banks in
developed countries and financial guarantors reported USD
180 billion and USD 50 billion losses and write-downs in
total. The impact on banks is particularly disturbing, because
the losses caused by the sub-prime crisis could hinder their
lending activity. While US and European banks are
continuously tightening their lending terms in respect of their
corporate and retail clients, they also strive to transfer the
rising cost of funds to these clients. Decelerating lending
weakens both consumption and investments, which in turn
has a negative impact on economic growth (‘financial
accelerator’ effect). In extreme cases, the credit crunch may
lead to recession.
THE SCOPE OF EUROPEAN AND
HUNGARIAN DIRECT EXPOSURE
The security-based exposure of the countries in the euro area
to the US mortgage market roughly amounts to a total of
EUR 200 billion (Table 1), comprising less than 2 per cent of
long-term security investments. It is important to note,
however, that only a fraction of the above EUR 200 billion is
linked to the sub-prime market. Of the total exposure, EUR
117 billion represents securities issued by mortgage
companies sponsored by the federal government, with no
sub-prime exposure whatsoever. On the other hand, some of
the exposures behind the securities issued by private
corporations, which amounts to a total of EUR 83 billion,
have no relation to the sub-prime market either. Another
important factor to underline is that, based on current
information, the parent banks of the largest Hungarian banks
typically have marginal direct exposures to the sub-prime
market. According to securities statistics, Hungarian banks do
not have instruments backed by foreign mortgages, and the
total volume of the portfolios in the bank’s custody,
particularly the investment fund portfolio, is negligible.
In the near future, the contagion effects of the sub-prime
crisis on other markets may have a negative impact primarily
on the profitability of investment banks and complex banking
groups with a strong investment business. Such effects may be
channelled through the declining volume of leveraged
buyouts and speculative corporate bond issues, the
substantial deterioration in trading profits, and potential
credit losses from defaulting hedge funds. In this context, the
impact on the foreign banking groups dominating the
domestic banking sector will be somewhat mitigated by the
fact that the most significant contributor to their business
activities and increased profitability of recent years was
income from traditional financial intermediary activities (e.g.
retail banking), which is largely attributable to their
significant expansion in lending in the regions of Central and
Eastern Europe.
From a broader perspective, it is important to assess how the
solvency situation of large US and European banks may
impact the stability of the European parent banks of
Hungarian banks. Up to now, the capital adequacy of some
US and European banks has deteriorated significantly, which
is reflected in decreasing stock prices. Capital was mainly
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Source: J. P. Morgan.
7 For details, see IMF Global Financial Stability Report (April 2008), visit: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/index.htm.raised by sovereign funds. Another risk may be that only a
part of expected losses has been reported up to now. The
increasing market role of non-transparent financial
institutions (hedge funds, private equity funds) and financial
innovations (credit risk transfer, CRT, products) deteriorates
the transparency of financial markets and impedes risk
pricing, and consequently, inhibits the adequate assessment
of direct and indirect credit market exposures to the sub-
prime crisis and the distribution of losses in the financial
sector. Another difficulty is posed by the financial institutions
themselves: many of them tend to conceal their losses for
business considerations, and thus the actual extent of losses is
not revealed until the institution is on the verge of
insolvency. As a consequence, European supervisory
authorities are exerting pressure on financial players to
report their exposures related to the US sub-prime mortgage
market as early and as precisely, as possible.
TURBULENCE ON THE FOREIGN
INTERBANK MONEY MARKETS AND 
ITS IMPACT
The temporary disorder experienced so far on the European
and US money markets did not have a significant effect on the
forint money markets. The FX swap market is the most
important factor in the forint liquidity of non-resident
players, and the forint interbank market, and its turnover did
not reflect any changes. International news did not have a
major influence on overnight forint yields, and nor were
central bank secured loans taken.
All in all, reports of market players are consistent with the
scenario described above based on the aggregate market
indices. According to some bank dealers, the lack of
confidence observed between the parent banks may have
appeared on the domestic market as well. However, the
reports of other dealers indicate that this opinion is neither
shared throughout the banking sector, nor reflected in the
actual market deals.
The crisis of confidence which appeared on the non-resident
interbank markets should not pose a threat in the future to
domestic banks, unless potential problems related to
confidence between the parent banks also extend to the
subsidiary banks. Only a prolonged confidence crisis would
have a notable impact, triggered by further negative news
involving some of the major market players. This may
manifest itself in decreasing interbank limits and higher
premiums for loans of banks that are deemed higher-risk
institutions. As a consequence, it is extremely important to
continuously monitor the domestic interbank markets and
payment systems in order to identify any potential contagion
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Euro area 200 83.2
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9The total mortgage market exposure consists of two main parts: securities issued by agents sponsored by the federal government (i.e. Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac),
and securities issued by private corporations.from the troubled European markets, a task that the central
bank of Hungary is obviously performing on a daily basis.
LONG-TERM FUNDING RISK OF
DOMESTIC BANKS
A prolonged increase in market liquidity risks may impact
domestic banks primarily through the pricing of and access to
non-resident interbank and capital market funding. Shrinking
liquidity primarily affects domestic banks through the
increasing cost of funds. Short-term non-resident interbank
interest rates and, to a certain extent, the higher, above pre-
crisis values of banks’ CDS premiums indicate that in the
event of a prolonged contraction of liquidity, the cost of non-
resident funds are expected to increase.
It is important to note, however, that a significant difference
may be observed on developed markets regarding the price of
non-resident funds. The 3-month TED spread increased, and
at this point it exceeds the level recorded in August by some
50 to 60 basis points. This is largely due to the fact that, by
means of the successful, temporary expansion of monetary
policy instruments, central banks have managed to
significantly alleviate the confidence crisis. In the meantime,
CDS premiums, used for assessing the price of long-term
funds, have shown a further increase (Chart 5). Since July,
2007, CDS premiums have increased by 250 to 260 basis
points, which may be explained by two primary factors. On
the one hand, credit risks have increased; and on the other
hand, there is less confidence in the risk rating of credit
derivatives of credit rating agencies.
The banking sector of the euro area promptly responded to a
potential divergence of short-term and long-term fund costs,
i.e. differences in costs over various time horizons.
Concerned about permanently high prices of long-term
funds, the banks increased the frequency of short-term
security issues, and held back on the issue of long-term
securities (Chart 6).
Due to the high proportion of non-resident funding in
general, and that of parent bank funding in particular,
pressure to shorten the average maturity of funds has become
typical in Hungary. By the end of 2007, domestic banks had
a worse funding structure (increasing ratio of short-term,
non-resident funds) and increased funding costs.
It is important to note, however, that the abundant liquidity
which characterised the past few years on a global scale is
expected to drop substantially over the long run, which may
adversely impact the domestic banking sector through
increasing funding costs and shrinking access to non-resident
funds. Shrinking access to non-resident funds may inhibit
loan originations, and pose increasing funding liquidity risks.
Funding liquidity risks may be mitigated by the fact that
nearly one-half of the banking sector’s non-resident funding
is provided by non-resident parent banks. On the other hand,
subsidiary banks may face increased liquidity risks if parent
banks reduce the average maturity of the funding they
provide to their subsidiaries.
RISK OF A CREDIT CRUNCH
In extreme cases, the sub-prime crisis related losses and
increasing funding costs of banks may lead to a credit crunch.
A credit crunch occurs when the willingness of banks to take
risks sharply declines to such an extent that they drastically
reduce their lending business, and despite increasing prices
they are not willing to expand their loan portfolio, i.e. the
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Eurozone: short term debt scurities (left-hand scale)
Eurozone: long term debt scurities (left-hand scale)
Hungary – short term foreign funds (right-hand scale)
Hungary – long term foreign funds (right-hand scale)
EUR Bn EUR Bn
Sources: ECB, MNB. credit supply curve becomes vertical. This setback in the
availability of loans can lead to an economic recession. The
sub-prime crisis may primarily result in a credit crunch in
countries where sophisticated financial markets are in place,
and capital markets play a major role in the financial
structure. With an eye to the underdeveloped local bond
markets, lack of loan securitisations, and the dominance of
bank loans, this channel has low relevance in Hungary. A
more likely channel for potential credit crunch contagion
could be the increasing risk avoidance and stricter lending
terms of parent banks, which may result in reduced credit
limits for subsidiaries.
Influenced by the sub-prime crisis, banks on developed
markets have introduced drastically tighter lending terms
regarding non-price related factors (Chart 7). The most
significant restrictions have affected the mortgage market in
the USA.
Restricted lending may spread to the domestic banking
sector if the subsidiaries of non-resident parent banks reduce
their credit limits. Thus far we have not experienced this; on
the contrary, commercial banks have introduced even more
relaxed terms for housing loans after the austerity measures
from last year, and this more lenient practice is expected to
continue in the first half of 2008. As far as consumer loans
are concerned, banks continue to ease their credit standards
(Chart 8). Apart from Hungary, Poland and Lithuania have
similar statistics in the region. In both countries of the
region, lending terms were tightened for housing loans, and
did not change notably in respect of consumer loans. In
neighbouring countries banks justified the more stringent
terms for housing loans by the deteriorating capital
adequacy, which followed the accelerated growth in the
volume of the loan portfolio.
Apart from non-price factors, it is also important to observe
factors affecting prices. The banking sector may react to the
increased cost of funds by reducing margins on the one hand,
and by raising interest payments for (existing and new) clients
on the other. The primary consequence of higher interest
payments for existing clients may be a deterioration of the
portfolio quality, and the increased instalments may reduce
the disposable portion of available income. Transferring costs
to new customers may have an adverse effect on credit
demand and consequently, on consumption. Currently, the
transfer of costs to new customers is not a typical practice
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Sources: National central banks.either in the region as a whole, nor in the euro area. The only
exception so far are the Baltic countries, where lending rates
on both the corporate and household markets increased
considerably, exceeding the 3-month reference interest rates
(Chart 9).
The increased cost of foreign funds and shrinking (FX)
liquidity may influence individual countries differently. The
impact may depend on a number of factors, including the
liquidity situation of parent banks, the tightness of the
position of subsidiary banks based on their loan-to-deposit
ratio, the profitability prospects of the banking sector in the
specific host country, and changes in the macroeconomic
environment. These last few factors may be significant
because they strongly influence liquidity allocation within
banking groups. It is unfavourable that the loan-to-deposit
ratio of the Hungarian banking sector is high compared to
international standards (Chart 10), the profitability of the
banking sector is on the decline, and macroeconomic activity
is low.
IS TURBULENCE SIMILAR TO THE US 
SUB-PRIME CRISIS LIKELY TO DEVELOP
IN HUNGARY?
Risk competition is intensifying in the practice of domestic
banks. Risk competition is usually reflected by extremely lax
credit standards and a new range of increasingly risky credit
products. Obviously, these two processes are interrelated.
While they keep loosening their credit standards, banks
attempt to generate considerable customer demand by
introducing new, high-risk products. A typical example for
this is the appearance of JPY-based credit products on the
market. On the other hand, the appearance of new products,
e.g. JPY-based loans, encourages competitors to offer similar
products on the market. At the same time, this trend also
encourages banks to make an effort to retain the competitive
nature of other credit products, primarily CHF-based loans,
and in order to reach this goal they are increasing LTV ratios
from a prudent level, i.e. reducing equity and increasing the
maximum period of maturity.
Having said that, a number of factors work against the
development of a similar crisis. Although the proportion of
loans with an LTV ratio over 70 per cent is dramatically
increasing within mortgage loans, the average LTV of the
loan portfolio is 50 per cent. In addition, in contrast to the
practices seen in the US sub-prime segment, black-listed
debtors are unable to obtain loans from banks in Hungary (if
they do obtain loans through financial companies financed by
some banks, they are relatively small in number and low in
value). In addition, there is no sign of a real estate bubble.
Finally, even though the debt service coverage ratio is slightly
higher than the EU average, the proportion of the mortgage
loan portfolio relative to the GDP is 10 per cent and
considered low, and this, again, works against the
development of a similar crisis.
GLOSSARY
ALT-A: With regard to risk the ALT-A category is located
between the prime and sub-prime market on the US mortgage
market. The candidates for ALT-A lending are considered
relatively good borrowers, but either lack reliable proof of
income or their debt-to-income ratio tends to be high.
Asset-backed securities (ABS): Securities backed by
portfolios of homogeneous debt groups (mortgage or motor
vehicle loans, credit cards, student loans, etc.). These
securities are issued by institutions established exclusively for
this purpose (SPV). One of the most important types of ABS
is MBS, a security with an underlying mortgage loan
collateral (mortgage-backed security). Changes in the prices
of the ABS market are indicated by the ABX index, a
synthetic, asset-backed credit derivative index.
Collateralised debt obligations (CDO): Special securities
backed by bonds, loans or other assets as collateral. Investors
purchasing the CDO assume the risk of the loan or bond
portfolio concerned. The CDO is issued by an entity
established solely for this purpose (special purpose vehicle,
SPV), which acquires the securities used as collateral. Based
on the different risk levels and maturities the issuer of the
CDO chops the credit and/or bond portfolio into pieces
(tranches). There are three risk categories reflected by three
tranches: senior tranches (AAA rating), mezzanine tranches
(from AA to BB ratings), and equity tranches (unrated). If the
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Source: ECB.securities are backed by loans or bonds only, they are called
collateralised loan obligations or CLO, and collateralised
bond obligations or CBO, respectively. 
Credit crunch: A period of recession in a debt-based
monetary system, when decelerating growth in debt creates a
liquidity shortage in the economy. It is often caused by lax,
inadequate lending policies, which generate losses for the
lending institutions and for investors trading in debt-type
instruments. Obtaining credit may become difficult or more
expensive for these institutions, which further increases their
accumulated losses.
Credit default swap, CDS: A derivative instrument to
transfer credit risk, where the buyer of the credit protection
pays a swap spread to the seller of the protection, who, in
turn, will guarantee the payment of the borrower’s debt.
Credit Risk Transfer Markets, CRT markets: A market
for those products, which are used for transferring the
default or bankruptcy risk of a client to another party. Credit
risks may be passed on through the physical transfer of
instruments (securitisation), or through a synthetic transfer
(credit derivatives). By means of securitisation the credit risk
attached to a specific instrument portfolio is transferred to
the investor through tradable securities (e.g. ABS). Risk
transfer is performed in at least two different investment
grade tranches. Credit derivatives are bilateral financial
contracts (e.g. CDS), which are used for separating the credit
risk of financial products from other risks, and for
transferring the risk to another party without transferring the
actual ownership of the underlying instrument.
FX swap: A short-term lending rate derivative traded on the
interbank market. It consists of a spot and a forward FX deal
made simultaneously in exactly the same foreign currency
amount. The position taken by the forward transaction is the
opposite of that of the spot transaction. Excess liquidity in
one foreign currency is swapped to another currency, where
liquidity can be made better use of. The forward interest rate
is fixed at the time of the deal, while the floating rate is the
O/N rate, which is realised on the spot deal on a daily basis.
Hedge funds: As opposed to traditional investment funds
these funds are private, closed, speculative-purpose
investment funds, which require a high initial minimum
investment amount. For this reason, the entities investing in
hedge funds are usually sophisticated, large institutional
investors, private pension funds, investment companies or
extremely wealthy private individuals. Due to their closed
nature they are exempt from several capital market
regulations and reporting responsibilities. Their position
taking is not restricted by any regulation, and they are
characterised by high leveraging, short positions, and the free
use of derivatives. 
High-yield bond/Junk bond: A short name for non-
investment grade corporate bonds, which, in return of their
higher than average risk, pay higher yields than the
traditional corporate bonds.
Leveraged buyout, LBO: A form of corporate financing
where the acquisition of a company’s majority ownership is
financed through debts (loans or bonds). Frequently, the
assets of the company being acquired are used as collateral
under the responsibility of the company performing the
buyout. Since in leveraged buyouts the debt-equity ratio is
usually 90 per cent, respectively, if bonds are used for a part
of the financing the issued papers are usually speculative
bonds (junk bonds).
LTV: Loan to Value = loan amount / collateral value.
Prime lending: Selling credit products to clients with
excellent credit rating and/or clean credit history. 
Private equity fund: Funds invested in companies and/or
complete business sectors with the purpose of obtaining
influential ownership. The influential ownership obtained
this way allows the owners to restructure the capital,
management and organisational structure of the target
company.
Special Purpose Vehicle, SPV: A legal entity established by
the securitisation issuer specifically for the purpose of
managing the transaction, which is independent of the
securitisation issuer both in respect of bankruptcy and tax
law. During the securitisation process, the financial service
provider pools and packages some of its assets under the SPV,
which then uses the assets as collateral to issue bonds or other
securities.
Structured Investment Vehicle, SIV: Funds established
for the purposes of credit arbitrage, taking advantage of the
difference between short and mid-term lending rates and the
yields of structured financing products. Their typical
investments include ABS securities and certain bonds issued
by financial corporations.
Sub-prime lending: These clients typically have below
average credit ratings because, being unable to prove regular
and timely loan payments, their credit history is
compromised (in the USA such clients are typically low
income or elderly individuals, or new immigrants).
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